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Defending the Detainees at Guantánamo Bay
by Richard J. Wilson
decided to build a more permanent facility, thus indicating its
intent to treat the detainees as long-term, perhaps lifelong,
prisoners.
There are now over 140 detainees whose families or friends
have taken legal action on their behalf. For those few, legal action
began in U.S. courts almost immediately after the first detainee
arrivals. Those legal actions were unavailing until the U.S.
Supreme Court reviewed a group of cases—Rasul v. Bush, Hamdi
v. Rumsfeld, and Rumsfeld v. Padilla—with the common question
of the meaning and implications of enemy combatant status, as
applied to citizens within the United States and foreign nationals
detained in Guantánamo. The Rasul decision dealt with a group of
foreign detainees at Guantánamo Bay, while the Hamdi and
Padilla decisions dealt with individual U.S. citizens held as enemy
combatants on the U.S. mainland. Since those decisions, the
government released Yasar Hamdi and returned him to his native

F

OLLOWING THE SEPTEMBER

11TH ATTACKS, the United States
began a military operation in Afghanistan on October 7,
2001, targeting Al Qaeda, the terrorist network believed to be
responsible for the attacks, and the Taliban government,
which sheltered Al Qaeda’s leader, Osama Bin Laden, and his followers. A month after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, President Bush
issued a Military Order for the capture and detention of those he
broadly designated as “enemy combatants.” The U.S. military base at
Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, soon began to receive detainees. Many
detainees who arrived in those first days remain there today, publicly
unidentified and held virtually incommunicado, without formal
charges and with few prospects for release. Although courts have
issued several favorable decisions relating to the rights of detainees,
few judges have applied international law, and the basic legal status of
the detainees remains unresolved three years after the facility opened.
This article briefly summarizes the defense of the detainees in
U.S. courts and the status of those claims. The article first provides
an overview of the detainees. It then reviews the litigation on
behalf of the foreign detainees that unfolded after the Supreme
Court’s decisions on detained enemy combatants in June 2004.
The article also describes the government’s creation of Combat
Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) and Annual Review Boards
(ARBs), and the role of counsel in each of these legal contexts.
Finally, this article reviews the work of defense counsel in the few
military commission trials that commenced before a federal judge
ordered all such trials suspended in November 2004.
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OVERVIEW OF THE DETAINEES IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY
AND THEIR LEGAL SITUATION
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SINCE THE OPENING IN GUANTÁNAMO BAY of Camp X-Ray, which
later became Camp Delta, the military has not publicly released
the names and countries of origin of the occupants of the camp.
Approximately 550 detainees from more than 40 countries are currently at Guantánamo. More than 100 detainees have been released,
most without charges or detention in their home countries upon
return. Some 450 detainees remain officially unidentified as of early
2005. Some have been detained for over three years without access to
counsel or the courts of any country. The U.S. government asserts that
the detainees remain detained because of the threat of their return to
hostilities and because they continue to provide useful intelligence to
the United States.
The detainees are permitted only limited mail access with the
outside world—to immediate family and counsel. Initially, the
detainees could only send and receive messages through the
International Committee of the Red Cross, which has continuously, but not publicly, monitored detention conditions. There were
more than 120 “self-harm” or suicidal events by detainees during
2004. Reports of torture and severe abuse of the detainees continue to emerge, but the government continues to deny any serious
mistreatment of detainees at the facility. The military recently
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Australia without charges. A federal judge ordered the release
of Jose Padilla from custody, but the government is appealing
the decision.

Moreover, the initial order creating the CSRTs asserts that all
detainees at Guantánamo Bay have already been determined to be
enemy combatants, thus casting doubt on the neutrality of the
entire subsequent process. Nevertheless, in July 2004, the
Department of Defense issued its rules for the operation of the
CSRTs. Casting further doubt on the process’ neutrality, the CSRT
rules gave evidence of enemy combatant status a rebuttable
presumption of being “genuine and accurate,” even prior to the
proceeding’s commencement.
The CSRTs were panels of three commissioned officers who
reviewed the evidence, both classified and public, regarding each
enemy combatant designation and determined enemy combatant
status by majority vote. Although the detainee was allowed to be
present for some of the
process, he could be
excluded during the consideration of classified
material. Witnesses on his
behalf would only be
produced if they were
“reasonably available.”
This standard resulted in
the denial of many potentially exculpatory witnessOmar Khadr, a Canadian citizen
es. Detainees could only
captured at age 15 in Afghanistan,
appeal the tribunal’s deciwas sent to Guantánamo Bay in
sion to the director of the
October 2002.
CSRT process, the convening authority.
Under the CSRT rules, each detainee was provided with a
Personal Representative, a commissioned officer with at least topsecret security clearance, to advise the detainee for his CSRT hearing. No other legal representation was allowed. The Personal
Representative did not have a confidential relationship with the
detainee, and had to advise the detainee that the representative
“may be obliged to divulge [information provided by the detainee]
at the hearing.” The detainee did not have the option of objecting
to the Personal Representative or other aspects of the CSRT
process, but instead could only decline to participate at all, a
choice that a large number of the detainees exercised.
Compliance by the CSRTs with domestic and international
precepts of due process and a neutral and fair hearing has become
a central issue in the ongoing federal court litigation on behalf of
the detainees. Federal court judges in Washington, D.C. reached
opposite conclusions on the issue in January 2005. Judge Joyce
Hens Green found that “the procedures provided in the CSRT regulations fail to satisfy constitutional due process requirements in
several respects.” Judge Richard Leon, who dismissed the detainee
cases before him on motion by the government, did not reach the
question of whether the CSRT process was adequate.
As of March 2005, the Department of Defense announced
that the CSRT process had been completed for all detainees, a total
of 558 cases. Of those, only 38 detainees were found not to be
enemy combatants, some as long ago as September 2004, and only
five of those have been released from Guantánamo.

LEGAL DEVELOPMENTS AND GOVERNMENT STRATEGIES
FOLLOWING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN RASUL

Photo permission of the Khadr family

IN RASUL, THE SUPREME COURT FOUND that the Guantánamo
detainees could seek review of their detention through a Writ of
Habeas Corpus, which allows prisoners to challenge the lawfulness of
their incarceration. The Court also held that territorial jurisdiction did
not depend on the location of the detainees, but lay in the location of
their custodians. Therefore, the proper venue was with the federal
district court of Washington, D.C., where all relevant federal officials
hold office. Because the Supreme Court had consolidated several individual detainee cases, each of those cases was assigned to a different
judge after the high court remanded the cases. The Center
for Constitutional Rights (CCR), an activist legal organization in New
York City which gathered the names of many detainees who were
awaiting access to the courts, sought volunteer lawyers to take new
cases into the federal district court.
Immediately after the Supreme Court’s decision, counsel filed
new cases on behalf of more than 60 detainees. Counsel immediately began efforts to gain access to their clients, access that the
government denied any detainee for the preceding two years. Over
time, additional detainees joined the initial group that filed in
court, and CCR filed a “John Doe” petition on behalf of all of the
unnamed detainees whose identities and particular facts are not yet
known publicly. The government has opposed these petitions with
a combination of post-hoc administrative procedures that attempt
to meet the concerns of the Supreme Court and aggressive litigation to continue to prevent the detainees’ access to the outside
world. These government strategies are discussed below.

COMBAT STATUS REVIEW TRIBUNALS
Within days after the Supreme Court decision, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz called for the creation of
Combat Status Review Tribunals, or CSRTs. The CSRT process
purports to determine whether an individual is properly designated as an enemy combatant. This new procedural device was adopted in place of the traditional rules governing the determination of
status of persons captured on the battlefield by a “competent
tribunal.” These traditional rules are articulated in both the Third
Geneva Convention and U.S. Army Regulation 190-8, which codifies the Geneva Convention’s rules on treatment of possible prisoners of war. Although those military regulations were operational
before the detentions at Guantánamo and during the U.S. military
occupation of Iraq, the U.S. government argues they do not apply
at Guantánamo because there is no doubt as to the detainees’
status as enemy combatants, as declared by President Bush.
An enemy combatant, under the CSRT definition, is “an
individual who was part of or supporting Taliban or Al Qaeda
forces, or associated forces that are engaged in hostilities against
the United States or its coalition partners.” Because of the broad
definition of enemy combatant used in both the Military Order
and the CSRTs, foreign enemy combatants also may have come to
Guantánamo other than by capture on the battlefield in
Afghanistan. The detainees’ lawyers argue that the vague and overbroad definition of enemy combatant is the very reason why the
President’s designations lack legal consistency and coherence.

THE ANNUAL REVIEW BOARD PROCESS
The government devised a second process, Annual Review
Boards, or ARBs, as a means for annual review of enemy combat2
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ant status. The ARB review standard is whether the enemy
combatant “presents a continuing threat to the U.S. or its allies in
the ongoing armed conflict against Al Qaeda and its affiliates and
supporters (e.g. Taliban) and whether there are other factors that
could form the basis for continued detention (e.g., the enemy
combatant’s intelligence value and any law enforcement interest in
the detainee).” Like the CSRTs and military commissions, the
three members of an ARB panel are military officers, one with
experience in the field of intelligence. The panel’s decisions include
continued detention, transfer, or release. The ARBs began to operate in late 2004, and as of the time of this writing, about 70 such
reviews have taken place, all without access to counsel and, until
recently, in closed hearings.

THE PROTECTIVE ORDER AND
ON DETAINEES’ COUNSEL

facility located in Washington, D.C., and tight restrictions on
client contact and visits at Guantánamo. Classified information
could not be disclosed to a detainee-client, even if it related to the
grounds for the detainee’s detention. These restrictions made visits
and communication with clients extremely cumbersome and slow,
and imposed another layer of complex filing requirements on
defense counsel.

CONSOLIDATION OF COMMON LEGAL ISSUES
AND COMPETING COURT DECISIONS
A subsequent government motion to dismiss all consolidated
cases for failure to state viable legal claims presented a serious concern for counsel and detainees. Despite the decisions in Rasul and
Hamdi, which clearly granted jurisdiction to the federal courts to
hear detainees’ habeas claims, the government persisted in arguing
that those decisions had only resolved the narrow question of
whether the federal courts had jurisdiction and not whether the
petitioners possessed any legal rights that could be enforced in U.S.
courts. The government continued to deny that U.S. or international law applied in Guantánamo Bay.
In January 2005, Judge Leon agreed with the government and
dismissed the detainee’s petitions. Two weeks later, Judge Green
held the opposite, denying the government’s motion to dismiss the
eleven cases consolidated before her. In the wake of her decision,
however, due to the conflict within the district and its potential

OTHER LIMITS

Almost as soon as the litigation in federal court began, after
remand from the Supreme Court in June 2004, the government
sought to limit unmonitored access by defense counsel to the
detainees and to impose other onerous restrictions on communication with clients, co-counsel, and the press or public.
Government lawyers cited national security concerns and argued
that the right to counsel for alleged enemy combatants was limited. The litigation soon centered on the argument by counsel for
the detainees to their unfettered right to full and open communi-

“The [United States] government has achieved its primary goal:
it largely has been able to keep the detainees in a ‘legal black hole.’”
cation with their clients. The issue was particularly sensitive with
regard to detainees subjected to continuous interrogation, who
were likely to be extremely suspicious of any new visitor purporting to act in their interests.
In October 2004, in Al Odah v. Bush, Judge Colleen KollarKotelly held for the first time that the right to counsel applied to
the detainees, and that visits to certain detainees by their counsel
could not be subjected to real-time video and audio monitoring,
nor could the government engage in “classification review” of notes
from attorney-client meetings of this limited group. The court
rejected the government’s argument that the “detainees would
‘attempt to use their [unknowing] counsel to engage in communications that would facilitate terrorist acts.’” The court instead
emphasized the importance of attorney-client privilege, stating
that “[t]he privilege that attaches to communications between
counsel and client has long held an exceptional place in the legal
system in the United States.”
In November 2004, in In re Guantánamo Detainee Cases,
Judge Green issued a broad protective order requiring that the
detainees’ lawyers meet a series of national security restrictions.
Among other impediments, it required security clearances for all
counsel and staff, review of classified documents only in a secure

impact on remaining issues in the litigation, Judge Green stayed all
proceedings until the issues are resolved on appeal. At the time of
this writing, the cases are pending and appear likely to proceed to
the Supreme Court again before the detainees eventually, if ever,
have their day in court.

MILITARY COMMISSION TRIALS IN GUANTÁNAMO
The U.S. government created the detention facility at
Guantánamo Bay primarily for military commission trials
designed to prosecute enemy combatants. The habeas litigation,
however, has taken precedence over such trials. Only 15 detainees
have been declared eligible for military trials, and only two began
their military commission trials at the base. In November 2004, a
federal judge ordered the trials stopped, but these trials may be
only on temporary hold and may re-emerge as the focus of the
legality of detention at Guantánamo.
Despite prior use of military commissions in U.S. history, the
government designed this commission process specifically for the
unique situation of enemy combatants who, according to the
administration, fell outside of the protections of both the law of
armed conflict, or international humanitarian law, and the traditional criminal process. Military commission trials most resemble
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a traditional criminal trial, with notable exceptions, particularly
regarding the right to defense. The commissions call for trials
before three to seven military officers chosen by the Appointing
Authority, whom the Secretary of Defense appoints. The
Appointing Authority chooses a presiding officer for each tribunal,
as well as the Chief Prosecutor and Chief Defense Counsel, with
only the latter two positions required to come from the military’s
legal branch, the Judge Advocate General’s (JAG) Corps.
Possible offenses on the list of crimes within commission
jurisdiction include war crimes, such as the willful killing of protected persons and the use of human shields, and terrorism crimes,
such as skyjacking. The list can include offenses occurring before
the instruction took effect. Conviction is by a two-thirds majority
of those finding guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. A separate twothirds vote imposes sentences of up to life imprisonment, and a
unanimous vote of seven members is needed to impose a death
sentence. Review is permitted within the executive branch, but
review by any domestic, foreign, or international court is expressly
forbidden. Even if acquitted, a detainee is subject to indefinite
detention at Guantánamo.
The defendant may be represented by a Detailed Defense
Counsel, assigned by the Chief Defense Counsel, who can be
assisted by civilian counsel retained by the detainee or a member
of the JAG Corps chosen by the detainee. The civilian counsel
must be a U.S. citizen with at least a “secret” security clearance and
must sign an agreement to comply with all rules of the tribunal.
Those rules require counsel to keep the identities of judges, witnesses, and other participants secret forever; bar counsel or the
defendant from certain closed hearings at which classified information is discussed; and allow for monitoring of attorney-client
communications for “security and intelligence” purposes, but not
for evidentiary reasons.
The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, a
U.S. association of public and private criminal defense lawyers,
declared that these conditions made it impossible for criminal
defense lawyers to provide adequate or ethical representation for
detainees and, therefore, found it unethical to represent detainees
before the commissions. The American Bar Association also called
on Congress and the executive branch to ensure that defendants
before the commissions “receive the zealous and effective assistance
of Civilian Defense Counsel.”
The military commission trials were under close public
scrutiny even before they began and barely commenced before a
judicial order closed them down. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Judge
James Robertson, hearing a habeas challenge to the commissions,
rejected the government’s position that Article II of the U.S.
Constitution gave the President unreviewable powers as
Commander-in-Chief to establish and run military commissions.
The court found that the Third Geneva Convention on Prisoners
of War applied to the conflict in Afghanistan, and that Salim
Ahmed Hamdan, who was captured there, could avail himself of
its provisions. The court found that that there was doubt as to
Hamdan’s status and that until a “competent tribunal” resolved his
status, a military commission could not try him. The court further
held that a commission trial could not go forward if Hamdan was
appropriately a prisoner of war. If determined to be a prisoner of
war, a traditional court-martial would be required to try Hamdan
with all procedural guarantees. A government appeal of that
decision was pending at the time of this writing.

CONCLUSION
THE LITIGATION OF THE GUANTÁNAMO detainee cases has taken many
diverse directions since the Supreme Court decisions in June 2004.
No less than ten substantive and procedural decisions have come
down from the federal court in Washington, D.C., each offering a
unique contribution to U.S. jurisprudence on the war on terror and
an interpretation of plenary presidential powers balanced against the
guarantees of due process and fair trial enforced by judicial oversight.
Of those decisions, only one favors the government’s strict interpretation of the President’s war powers, while the rest affirm the detainees’
rights to access to counsel and the courts. Remarkably, only the
Hamdan case used international law as a key element of its analysis.
Indeed, had the courts, including the U.S. Supreme Court, turned to
the clear rules of international humanitarian law, it is likely that their
decisions would have been less opaque and more susceptible to clear
and consistent interpretation by the lower courts.
Whatever else can be said of the processes devised to deal with
the detainees at Guantánamo Bay, it must be conceded that
the government has achieved its primary goal: it largely has been
able to keep the detainees in a “legal black hole.” The detainees
have slow and inadequate legal redress with little hope of release
through court action any time in the immediate future. The courts
should continue to assert their appropriate role to assure that due
process is provided to all of the detainees and that the detainees’
appropriate status in international humanitarian law is determined. U.S. courts, the detainees’ sole recourse, must assist
them in a final decision as to whether and when they should be
held or released as criminals, prisoners of war, or innocent
civilians.
HRB
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